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Abstract
Plurality and runoff systems offer very different incentives to parties and coali-
tion of voters, and demand different political strategies from potential candidates
and chief executives. Italian mayors and city councils are elected with a differ-
ent electoral system according to the locality’s population, while municipalities are
otherwise treated identically in terms of funding and powers. We exploit this insti-
tutional feature to test how the presence of different electoral systems affects the
central government decisions on grants, and the local government decisions on lo-
cal taxes. We find evidence that the upper-tier governments favour runoff-elected
mayors, and that runoff-elected mayors levy lower taxes.This is broadly consistent
with the literature on runoff and plurality rule electoral systems.
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Dept. of Economics, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YW, UK; email: e.bracco@lancaster.ac.uk.





It is well known that electoral systems have a strong impact on the behaviour of
voters, politicians and parties. For instance, proportional representation and par-
liamentary systems have been shown to generate higher level of public spending
than majoritarian and presidential systems (Persson and Tabellini (2005), Milesi-
Ferretti et al. (2002)), or that plurality rule tends to go together with two-party
systems (Duverger’s Law). Economic literature also explored extensively the polit-
ical economy of intergovernmental grants, focusing in particular on how the central
government favours localities according to the political alignment or the electoral
allegiance of the jurisdiction.
The present paper wants to connect these two strands of literature. Firstly, we
explore the central government’s behaviour in deciding intergovernmental grants
to municipalities, and how its decision is affected by the mayoral electoral law.
Secondarily, we investigate whether the way in which a mayor is elected affects his
or her behaviour focusing on taxation decisions.This issue is particularly relevant,
considering how it is not only an Italian peculiarity that local authorities are subject
to heterogeneous sets of regulations within the same country and the same tier. The
most evident example is the United Kingdom, in which some cities directly elect
their mayors, while most of them only elect councils, and institutions vary across
the four nations composing the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland).
We perform a comprehensive analysis of the balance sheets of Italian municipal-
ities, exploiting a particular institutional feature. Italian mayors are elected with a
different electoral system according to the population of their jurisdiction. Mayors
of smaller municipalities (below 15,000 inhabitants) are elected through a first-
past-the-post electoral system, while mayors of larger municipalities (above 15,000
inhabitants) are elected through a runoff electoral system. By runoff it is meant
a two-stage electoral system in which the winner is chosen through first defining
a subset of candidates—usually two—out of which the winner is then selected. In
particular, in those Italian municipalities is in use a system similar to the one used
in French Presidential elections, through which if no candidate obtains an absolute
majority of votes, then voters are called a second time to the polls to choose between
the winner and the runner up of the first round.
This sharp institutional change allows us to use a regression-discontinuity design
(RDD), which exploits the exogenous variation which occurs in a neighbourhood of
the threshold. We can say that for municipalities whose population is close to the
15,000-inhabitant threshold the electoral system is assigned almost randomly. This
in turn allows us to establish a causal link between our findings in terms of grants,
taxation and the electoral system itself.
Our analysis confirms a strong and significant effect of the electoral system in
terms of intergovernmental grants, and tax revenues.The central government favours
municipalities which are politically aligned assigning them larger grants, but only
as long as their electoral system is runoff. Simultaneously, those municipalities are
able to lower their taxes.
Runoff electoral systems have received relatively little attention in the literature,
with most of the works focusing on the effect of electoral systems on candidacies
and policies. For example Osborne and Slivinski (1996) prove that with ideologically
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motivated candidates and sincere voting, policy platforms are generally more dis-
persed under plurality, and the number of active candidates is larger under runoff.
Bordignon et al. (2011) as well reached a similar conclusion with regard to the equi-
librium policies and number of candidates, and also remark how runoff systems elicit
more “centrist” policy platforms, limiting the influence of extremist voters. Finally,
Myerson (1999) reviews (almost) all electoral systems and the strategic incentives
they offer to potential candidates and parties, but does not look into the effects of
runoff.
Empirical works have instead found contradictory results with respect to the
number of candidates: according to Callander (1999) plurality elections tend to see
more candidates running, while according to some other papers (Wright and Riker
(1989), Cox and Neto (1997), Chamon et al. (2008) and again Bordignon et al.
(2011)) more candidates are observed in runoff elections. Fujiwara (2011) instead
finds empirical evidence that voters are more likely to concentrate their choices on
the two top candidates in plurality as opposed to runoff elections, where strategic
voting is therefore more limited.
Using a very similar—albeit “shorter”—dataset to ours, Barone and de Blasio
(2011) finds that municipalities with runoff electoral system see higher percentages
of turnout in local and general elections, and show a larger dispersion of expenditures
across items (as defined by accounting regulations), which the authors link toz a
better capacity to represent voters’ preferences.
From the public finance perspective, Chamon et al. (2008) explore the effects
of the electoral system on mayors’ decision on investment expenditures. They find
that among Brazilian mayors, those elected through a runoff electoral system have
higher investment and education spending. Their explanation relies on the fact
that the runoff electoral system, also because of the larger number of candidates,
is considered to be more open to political competition and therefore better able to
foster the selection of the best candidate.
These very results are not confirmed by our own analysis, which used a larger
dataset and panel data techniques. Another paper that analyses this issue through
an Italian dataset is Rizzo and Zanardi (2010), which found in a contribution that
pre-dates ours, that runoff-elected mayors are more likely to reduce taxes (especially
if they are seeking re-election), and spend more in road maintenance.
The link between central and local government’s behaviour under different elec-
toral system is analyzed by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010), who establish that
municipalities characterized by proportional representation are less responsive in
terms of tax and spending behaviour to central government’s decisions on grants.
Other papers explore instead the link between the size of government (e.g. the
number of legislators/councillors) and spending, as expressed in the seminal pa-
per Weingast et al. (1981). Among others, Egger et al. (2010) finds evidence from
Bavarian municipalities that indeed larger councils induce higher per-capita spend-
ing, leveraging on our same regression-discontinuity technique in order to establish
a robust causal link between the institutional setup and the government behaviour.
Our paper also relates to the fiscal federalism and political economy literature
on intergovernmental grants. On the theory of local public finance Oates (1972),
Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959), Grossman (1994), Lockwood (2002) are the main
works that explore the rationale of devolving to local authorities monies, tasks, and
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the powers to impose taxes. Dixit and Londregan (1998a, 1998b), Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987, 1993) looked into whether the central government favors localities
which are either solidly aligned, or electorally more balanced, and found evidence in
favor of the latter. Cox and McCubbins (1986) found instead that solidly partisan
localities aligned with the central government are bound to receive more funds.
There is also a very large empirical literature on the effects of political alignment
between central and local politicians on intergovernmental grants: a non-exhaustive
list includes Levitt and Snyder (1995), Worthington and Dollery (1998), Johansson
(1999), Case (2001), Porto and Sanguinetti (2001), Rodden and Wilkinson (2004)
(who also analyze the different behavior with respect to grants of coalition as op-
posed to single-party governments), Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro (2006), Arulam-
palam et al. (2008). These papers generally highlighted a positive and significant
alignment effect.
On a similar topic, Bracco et al. (2012) found that aligned and marginally elected
mayors tend to receive more federal grants, and consequently lower the level of tax-
ation in their jurisdiction, increasing in this way their chances of victory. Their
analysis is restricted to Italian municipalities whose mayors are elected with runoff
electoral system. The present work extends their analysis also to smaller munici-
palities with plurality-elected mayors.
More generally, our work relates as well with the wider political economy liter-
ature on the effect of institutions—and electoral systems in particular—on the be-
havior of politicians. Among these we cite Lancaster (1986), Persson and Tabellini
(1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) on the difference
between proportional representation systems and majoritarian systems, Myerson
(1992) on the influence of minorities under different electoral systems (which doesn’t
take into account the runoff system, though), and Myerson (1991) on the effects on
corruption. Finally, Gagliarducci et al. (2008) explore the different incentives that
different electoral systems pose on legislators’ behavior.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the Italian institutional
setup, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 the empirical strategy, and Section 5
goes through the empirical results and concludes.
2 Institutional Background
The Italian political system is mostly famous for its instability and the large number
of parties. Nevertheless, since the mid-Nineties in most of elections at every level of
government, two blocks of parties (i.e. pre-electoral coalitions) have been challenging
each other. Both at the central and at the local level the coalitions are formed before
the elections, so that voters can identify the two main contender for the governing
position, be it the prime-ministerial or mayoral seat. This allows us to cluster almost
all of the many parties into two categories (centre-left and centre-right) and define
political alignment according to a binary (left–right/aligned–unaligned) variable.
From the public finance perspective, the Italian municipal financing is the result
of successive sedimentation of reforms, some of which where swiftly scrapped as
the central government changed hands. As a result, the overall picture is generally
patchy and cannot be easily described in a systematic way (see Brugnoli (2011)
for a precise account of its historical dynamics). Each year through the Budget
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Bill the central government decides the grants to be transferred to municipalities
with no reference to any formula or binding guideline. On the one hand, this
suggests the possibility of large discretionary funds being allocated to municipalities.
On the other hand this system is very rigidly linked to the so-called “historical
expenditures” of municipalities, and to very many laws that regulate single aspects
of public good provision and welfare policies. Moreover, most local government
outlays are determined by past behaviors, with strong path-dependence in the levels
of expenditure, and in the grants awarded yearly.
About 40% of municipalities’ revenues come from upper-tier block grants, the
vast majority of which is from the central government. Roughly the same amount
of revenues is raised through taxes. A large share of tax revenues comes from a
property tax (ICI) based on the land-registry value of properties, and on which
municipalities can decide the tax rate. Municipalities also receive shares of personal
income tax, and can apply a limited surtax on the personal income tax rate. They
also charge fees and duties for a number of services, like the issuance of vital record
certificates, public billboards, planning permissions, rubbish collection.
Municipalities are run by directly elected mayors together with their city council.
The balance of power is strongly tipped in favour of mayors, whose resignation
triggers the disbandment of the council and the call for new mayoral and council
elections. The electoral system is such that in the vast majority of cases mayors
have a solid majority in the council, and therefore have limited necessity to bargain
policies with it.
As already mentioned in the introduction, mayors and city councils are elected
through different electoral system according to the population of the municipalities.
Municipalities over 15,000 inhabitants (from now on, larger municipalities) elected
their mayors through a runoff electoral system, while municipalities with less that
15,000 inhabitants use a first-past-the post system. The city council is elected
through a proportional representation system with open lists. Each list is visibly and
transparently linked to one of the mayoral candidates. In smaller municipalities each
mayoral candidate is linked with a single city-council list, while in larger ones each
mayoral candidate can be linked with a coalition of city-council lists. The electoral
mechanism is such tat the list(s) linked with the winning mayors are (generally) to
be awarded a majority of seats in the council. This implies that the incentives in
terms of coalition formation are quite different: in smaller municipalities, parties
are pushed to “merge” into one city-council list if they want to jointly field a single
mayoral candidate, while in larger ones parties wishing to jointly field a single
mayoral candidate can do that also running separately for the city council elections
(albeit all visibly “linked” with their mayoral candidate). On the other hand, as
pointed out by Bordignon et al. (2011), in runoff elections coalitions need not to
be as wide as in a first-past-the-post, and extremist parties are less pivotal. As a
consequence, in larger municipalities there is a wider array of parties represented in
the council, and also a larger number of mayoral candidates running.
Full details on the institutional and financial regulation of Italian municipalities
are included in the Appendix.
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3 The Data
We analyze data from the balance sheets (Conti Consuntivi) and “Entitlement
Grants” (Spettanze) of Italian municipalities in ordinary-statute regions,1 for the
period 1998–2008. Intergovernmental grants are observed twice, once in the mu-
nicipalities’ balance sheets, and a second time in the central-government accounts
that go under the name of Entitlements (Spettanze). The figures from these two
sources do not perfectly match, and the latter is likely to track more faithfully
central government decisions on grants to municipalities. The discrepancies may
derive from the fact that the central government transfers funds to municipalities
for a large array of reasons (e.g. to compensate municipalities for the extra-cost of
a new civil service pay deal, to deal with natural disasters), which go beyond the
amount included in the Entitlements accounts, and that affect the balance–sheet fig-
ures. Secondarily, the differences in central government decision, accounting rules
applied at the local level, and accrual of funds to municipalities may be responsible
of further discrepancies.
The yearly budgets include a large array of data on revenues (grants from any
upper tier of government, property tax, income surtax, tariffs and fees) and ex-
penditure (social, culture, sports...). All the data related to local public finance
are collected and published by the Interior Ministry. For our analysis—on the rev-
enue side—we will focus on a limited number of entries: total central-government
grants (from both the balance sheets and the Entitlement accounts), and total fiscal
revenues.
We then use a series of political and demographic controls. These include data on
the Lower House general elections in 1996, 2001 (proportional representation ballot
paper), and 2006, at the municipality level, and aggregated the party votes into two
blocks corresponding to the center-left and center-right parties.2 From the Interior
Ministry database of local-authority elected officers we obtained data on each mayor,
including party affiliation and year of election, and also political affiliation of upper
tiers of government. This allows us to build a political alignment dummy, which
takes value 1 when the mayor and the prime minister are from the same political
coalition at the time when financial decision are taken (i.e. the end of the calendar
and fiscal year). We also include a dummy for left-wing mayors, and for the local
electoral cycle.
In the three general elections which are relevant for our analysis (1996, 2001
and 2006), each time the incumbent coalition lost. Moreover local elections in Italy
happen every year, as in case a mayor resigns or dies elections are called straight
away. This implies that we have a good amount of variation both in terms of time
series and cross-section in the alignment dummy and in the political allegiance of
1Five out of the twenty Italian regions enjoy particular forms of autonomy for historical or geographical
reasons. These are Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia and Sicily. As
different public finance rules apply to them, we decided to exclude them from the analysis.
2The lists which are considered right-wing are: Alleanza Nazionale, Popolo delle liberta`, Lega Nord,
CCD-CDU, Fiamma Tricolore, Forza Italia, Nuovo PSI, Partito Repubblicano Italiano, UDC, Nuova
Democrazia Cristiana, Alternativa Sociale. Left-wing lists are: Comunisti Italiani, Il Girasole, La
Margherita, Democratici, Partito Democratico, Lista Di Pietro, Rifondazione Comunista, Verdi, Re-
pubblicani Europei, Democratici di Sinistra, UDEUR, SVP. For the 1996 and 2001 general elections the
municipality-level results from the proportional-representation Lower House ballot paper are used.
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municipalities.
From the National Statistical Office (ISTAT) we obtained demographic data at
the municipality level: in particular the resident population, the share of children
(under 6), and elderly (over 65 years old) both from the censuses held in 1991 and
2001, and from the “inter-census reconstruction,” tracking these figures yearly. To
record the income level in each municipalities, we sourced Treasury data on the
personal income tax base at the municipality level. Each monetary figure has been
deflated taking 2008 as a year of reference, and converted in Euros when necessary.
A thorough description of the data and its sources is relegated to the Data
Appendix. Summary statistics are reported in Table 4.
4 Empirical Strategy
We use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) around the 15,000-inhabitant
threshold. The likelihood that a municipality has a population just above or just
below the threshold is understood to be random, and helps us to overcome the pres-
ence of confounding and unobservable factors that affect both the central govern-
ment decision on grants and the local governments’ decision on taxes.The electoral
system varies sharply across the given population threshold, and allows us to treat
this situation as a quasi-experimental setting.
Following this approach, we compare municipalities which are just above the
population threshold (and therefore use a runoff electoral system), with munici-
palities who are just below that threshold (and therefore use a first-past-the-post
electoral system).
Among the various possibilities of implementation of the RDD design (see Lee
and Lemieux (2010) for a survey), we decided to take a parametric approach and
include among the regressors a n-th degree polynomial of the forcing variable, in-
teracted with the treatment. For completeness and robustness, the results obtained
through a non-parametric approach with varying optimal bandwidth and rectangu-
lar kernel are also included.
With a dataset stretching for a 11-year period, a panel data approach seems the
most appropriate. The basic econometric specification is therefore the following:










+ δ′ Xit + µt + φi + it (1)
where the dummy variable runoffit takes the value 1 when the incumbent mayor
has been elected through a runoff election, i.e. when the latest available census
figure at the time of his or her election was over 15,000 inhabitants, the census
variable contains the census population figure (in thousands) at the time of the
most recent municipal elections for that specific municipality. As is standard in
the literature, this variable has also been re-scaled so that it takes the value 0 in
correspondence with the 15,000-inhabitant cut-off. The terms in the square brackets
are a n-th degree polynomial of the forcing variable (census) also interacted with
the treatment variable (runoff ).
We then have the above mentioned demographic, political and economic con-
trols (X it), year fixed effects, and the usual error term it. The regressions will be
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performed first intending the term φi as municipality fixed effects, as suggested by
the Hausman test. For robustness and completeness the results obtained using a
random-effect model are also reported.
As we are interested in seeing the effects of the electoral system, our focus will
be on the sign, magnitude and significance of the coefficient β.
The political controls include an alignment dummy, which takes the value 1 when
mayor and Prime Minister belong to the same political coalition (which will also be
interacted with the electoral system dummy), a “swing” constituency dummy, which
takes the value 1 when the electoral allegiance of the municipality is not strongly
leaning to either side, and variables that take into account the local and central
political cycle (see the Data Appendix for the details). The (per-capita) personal
income tax base is included as well. The demographic controls instead include the
composition of the population (children under 6 years old and elderly people over
65) from the yearly inter-census reconstructions.
Previous literature (Chamon et al. (2008), Bordignon et al. (2011)) points out
that runoff is a more competitive electoral system than simple plurality, which
should insure a better selection of the political class. Moreover Barone and de Bla-
sio (2011) found that runoff municipalities show stronger political participation.
Qualitative analysis of the political allegiance of mayors across the 15,000-inhabitant
threshold—in the data Appendix—also points out that in larger municipalities poli-
ties are more likely to be dominated by national parties, as opposed to local voters’
associations.
All these factors make us believe that there are good reasons for the central
government to favour runoff-elected mayors when deciding the grant distribution.
More generally, these difference are likely to elicit differences in terms of taxation
behaviour.
5 Results and Concluding Remarks
For the sake of synthesis and clarity we include only the results for the coefficient
of interest, i.e. the electoral-system dummy runoff, which takes value 1 when the
incumbent mayor has been elected through a runoff electoral system. We include
the results for various specifications of the polynomial (from the first to the seventh
degree), with or without the additional controls. Robust standard errors clustered
at the municipal level are used in all the results shown. The robustness checks are
relegated to the Appendix.
As we can see in Table 5, there is a strong effect of the electoral system on
fiscal revenues: mayors elected through runoff charge up to 35 Euros per capita
less than their colleagues elected through plurality rule. On the other hand, the
the electoral system does not show any statistically significant and robust effect on
central-government grants, whether we consider the balance sheet or the Entitlement
figures.
In Table 6 we analyze the same figures, but interacting the electoral system
dummy with the political alignment between mayor and Prime Minister. From this
table, which again reports only the coefficients of interest, we have evidence that the
central government takes into account the electoral system of municipalities when
deciding grants.
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In particular, we can see that the central government favours municipalities
which are simultaneously politically aligned and characterized by a runofff elec-
toral system granting them around 8 extra Euros per capita (first column, middle
panel of Table 6). No effect is instead found for municipalities which are politically
aligned, but have mayors elected with plurality rule (last column, middle panel).
This underlines the fact that the central government seem to consider only larger
municipalities as politically relevant and worth a “differential treatment”. This re-
sult is particularly evident when considering the Entitlement figures, which track
more closely the central government decisions. The results are very robust across
specifications; nevertheless, we provide the details of the Akaike’s information cri-
teria (see Table 7 and 8), useful to understand which is the most efficient model,
and to choose the most reliable point estimate.
From the last panel of Tables 5-6 we can also see that runoff-elected mayors
are able to ask their citizens substantially less taxes: up to 36 Euros per capita,
independently of the specification, and of the interaction with the alignment dummy.
This may partially be due to the substitution between grants and taxes as found by
Bracco et al. (2012), and partially by the fact that runoff insures a better selection
of politicians, as stated in Chamon et al. (2008).
In synthesis, we find robust evidence that the difference in institutional setup,
namely caused by a different electoral system, elicits a number of differences in
municipalities. First of all, the central government ignores municipalities below the
threshold, and instead rewards the ones above the threshold (and run by runoff-
elected mayors) rewarding them on average 8 extra Euros per capita, conditional
on the municipality being politically aligned with the central government. At the
same time, there is evidence that runoff-elected mayors decrease taxes.These find-
ings shed additional light on the well-known effect of institution into public finance
dynamics. Legislators should therefore consider carefully when designing differential
institutional solutions for similar jurisdictions, as these are likely to generate possi-
bly unintended discrepancies in terms of public good provision and more generally
in terms of voters’ welfare.
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Table 1: Partisan and Non-Partisan Mayors by Electoral System in Municipalities with
10-20 thousand inhabitants
First-past-the post Runoff
Party-linked mayors 63% 89%
Independent mayors 37% 11%
Source: Italian Interior Ministry. Municipalities within the population interval
[10,000–20,000]. Incumbent mayors in years 1998-2008.
Table 2: Municipalities by electoral system and year
year Single Ballot Dual Ballot Total
1998 6,158 562 6,720
1999 6,154 562 6,715
2000 6,153 562 6,715
2001 6,154 562 6,715
2002 6,149 565 6,714
2003 6,149 562 6,715
2004 6,141 574 6,715
2005 6,143 572 6,715
2006 6,138 577 6,715
2007 6,131 584 6,715
2008 6,136 584 6,720
Total 67,606 6,268 73,874
Source: Italian Interior Ministry. Municipalities in ordinary-statute
regions
13
Table 3: Municipalities changing electoral system, by election year after the 2001 Census







Source: Italian Interior Ministry. Only
Ordinary-Statute regions.
Figure 1: Municipalities by population and by Census (1991 on the left, 2001 on the
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Insitutional Background
Mayoral Electoral Systems and Polity
Italy is divided in 20 regions, more than a hundred counties (province), and over
8,000 municipalities (comuni), many of which are very small,3. Municipalities pro-
vide basic public goods like primary schools, nurseries, public transport, and basic
social services. Mayors are very visible and important figures from the electorate’s
perspective: municipalities are perceived as the closest and most practically useful
political institution, and this is mirrored by the very high turnout at municipal
elections; second only to the general elections’ turnout.4
3Only around a hundred of them have more than 50,000 inhabitants, while almost 6,000 municipalities
have less than 5,000 inhabitants.
4For example, in 2009 the European Parliament elections took place; in some municipalities also
mayors and city council were elected at the same time. Voters’ turnout has been 66.47% where only
European elections where held, and 76.69% in municipalities where also municipal elections were held. In
14
Table 4: Summary Statistics.
Variable	   	   Source	   mean	   sd	   min	   max	  
StateGrants	   balance-­‐sheet	  grants	   MI	   119.8955	   99.16257	   0	   1164.54	  
Entitlements	   Entitlement	  grants	   MI	   80.07825	   83.19578	  
-­‐9.63E-­‐
07	   1190.354	  
FiscalRev	   tax	  revenues	   MI	   444.0469	   186.0161	   0.154622	   3376.671	  
CurrXP	   Current	  expenditure	   MI	   737.0518	   246.2049	   0.563505	   3446.381	  
GenExp	   General	  exp.	   MI	   241.3111	   67.84368	   0	   857.9855	  
JustExp	   Justice	  exp.	   MI	   1.968083	   5.936636	   0	   147.7768	  
LocalPolice	   Local-­‐police	  exp.	   MI	   37.43488	   18.57008	   0	   380.7143	  
EducExp	   Education	  exp.	   MI	   79.40656	   34.58797	   0	   441.1037	  
CultureExp	   Culture	  exp.	   MI	   23.13919	   18.27171	   0	   175.2742	  
Housing	   Housing	  exp.	   MI	   150.6074	   93.01034	   0	   1999.851	  
SportExp	   Sports	  exp.	   MI	   13.70063	   12.31781	   0	   395.4654	  
TourismExp	   Tourism	  exp.	   MI	   4.938291	   15.04184	   0	   575.3424	  
TrafficExp	   Traffic	  exp.	   MI	   53.05811	   29.62263	   0	   516.7605	  
SocialExp	   Social	  exp.	   MI	   23.96335	   48.3717	   0	   1016.297	  
Econo	   Business	  services	  exp.	   MI	   28.05103	   77.36395	   0	   1299.69	  
runoff	  
=1	  if	  mayor	  has	  been	  
elected	  with	  runoff	  el.sys.	   MI	   0.103585	   0.304737	   0	   1	  
census	  
Census	  population	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  latest	  election,	  
normalized	  (	  -­‐	  15,000)	   ISTAT	   20303.69	   78891.11	   5005	   2775250	  
align	  
=1	  if	  mayor	  and	  Prime	  
Minister	  belong	  to	  the	  
same	  coalition	   MI	   0.257295	   0.437166	   0	   1	  
swing	  
=1	  if	  %	  votes	  to	  left	  parties	  
in	  the	  latest	  general	  
election	  is	  between	  45%	  
and	  55%	   MI	   0.227282	   0.419098	   0	   1	  
ciclo_mayor	  
Number	  of	  years	  to	  next	  
mayoral	  election	   MI	   2.08045	   1.466595	   1	   5	  
left_mayor	   =1	  if	  mayor	  is	  left-­‐wing	   MI	   0.43664	   0.495995	   0	   1	  
density	   Population/hectar	   ISTAT	   672.6556	   1040.744	   18.47382	   13289.38	  
child	  
%	  of	  population	  <14	  yrs	  
old	   ISTAT	   0.143393	   0.024554	   0.081628	   0.260855	  
elderly	  
%	  of	  population	  >65	  yrs	  
old	   ISTAT	   0.187192	   0.041615	   0.057666	   0.332769	  
incomepp	  
Income-­‐tax	  base	  per	  
capita	   MF	   17440.14	   3549.543	   7264.057	   51073.13	  
All	  monetary	  figures	  are	  in	  2008	  constant	  Euros,	  per	  capita.	  MI=	  Interior	  Ministry.	  MF=Finance	  



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Effect of Electoral System and Political Alignment on Revenues.
Balance-Sheet Grants
Polynomial Controls Runoff*Align Runoff*(1-Align) (1-Runoff)*Align
β s.d. β s.d. β s.d.
1st N 8.702* (5.104) 1.727 (4.987) -1.664 (1.190)
2nd N 7.349 (5.611) 0.369 (5.505) -1.662 (1.190)
3rd N 7.770 (5.607) 0.749 (5.512) -1.648 (1.190)
4th N 7.997 (5.611) 0.980 (5.514) -1.637 (1.190)
5th N 8.412 (5.610) 1.454 (5.518) -1.611 (1.190)
6th N 8.634 (5.617) 1.676 (5.522) -1.603 (1.190)
7th N 8.520 (5.641) 1.569 (5.536) -1.606 (1.190)
1st Y 8.386 (5.140) 1.715 (5.003) -1.725 (1.317)
2nd Y 8.858 (5.651) 2.190 (5.529) -1.726 (1.317)
3rd Y 9.347* (5.649) 2.644 (5.539) -1.721 (1.316)
4th Y 9.652* (5.654) 2.965 (5.543) -1.724 (1.316)
5th Y 10.114* (5.656) 3.521 (5.550) -1.728 (1.316)
6th Y 10.468* (5.663) 3.889 (5.555) -1.730 (1.316)




Year fixed effects Y
Entitlement Grants
1st N 8.410** (3.733) 1.760 (3.775) -1.783 (1.234)
2nd N 6.694* (4.018) 0.044 (4.060) -1.781 (1.234)
3rd N 7.006* (4.013) 0.333 (4.077) -1.772 (1.234)
4th N 7.293* (4.020) 0.619 (4.076) -1.758 (1.234)
5th N 7.884* (4.029) 1.261 (4.087) -1.722 (1.234)
6th N 7.808* (4.035) 1.189 (4.091) -1.725 (1.234)
7th N 7.886* (4.053) 1.260 (4.099) -1.723 (1.234)
1st Y 9.596*** (3.701) 3.024 (3.709) -1.216 (1.421)
2nd Y 7.773* (3.990) 1.204 (4.010) -1.215 (1.421)
3rd Y 8.079** (3.985) 1.494 (4.027) -1.212 (1.421)
4th Y 8.401** (3.993) 1.826 (4.027) -1.213 (1.421)
5th Y 9.025** (4.005) 2.536 (4.038) -1.210 (1.421)
6th Y 9.028** (4.013) 2.539 (4.045) -1.210 (1.421)




Year fixed effects Y
Fiscal Revenues
1st N -14.715 (12.529) -15.000 (12.451) 3.315* (1.861)
2nd N -34.104*** (12.452) -34.490*** (12.359) 3.397* (1.856)
3rd N -32.313*** (12.505) -32.873*** (12.387) 3.456* (1.856)
4th N -30.794** (12.577) -31.330** (12.430) 3.534* (1.857)
5th N -29.470** (12.646) -29.818** (12.485) 3.615* (1.858)
6th N -28.491** (12.680) -28.838** (12.515) 3.652** (1.858)
7th N -26.252** (12.737) -26.731** (12.571) 3.714** (1.859)
1st Y -13.859 (12.364) -13.866 (12.296) 4.092** (2.001)
2nd Y -34.477*** (12.209) -34.568*** (12.132) 4.153** (1.991)
3rd Y -32.544*** (12.271) -32.771*** (12.166) 4.173** (1.991)
4th Y -30.868** (12.365) -31.008** (12.223) 4.158** (1.991)
5th Y -29.415** (12.469) -29.260** (12.305) 4.144** (1.990)
6th Y -28.338** (12.509) -28.141** (12.340) 4.136** (1.991)




Year fixed effects Y
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Parametric Fixed-effect model with errors clustered at
the municipality level. Reported are solely the figures for the interaction between the runoff
and the alignment dummies for different specifications.
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Table 7: Akaike’s Information Criterion on Table 5’s Regressions.
Polynomial Balance-Sheet Grants Entitlements Grants Fiscal Revenues
1st 172972.908 138666.632 174079.649
2nd 172976.139 138647.337 173974.227
3rd 172977.998 138641.483 173928.351
4th 172964.913 138632.854 173889.701
5th 172955.802 138606.878 173870.716
6th 172953.004 138606.329 173861.579
7th 172952.711 138600.873 173811.266
1st 160866.172 124594.605 148913.173
2nd 160866.453 124583.705 148820.744
3rd 160866.177 124574.133 148760.519
4th 160847.397 124566.848 148715.900
5th 160839.440 124544.739 148688.472
6th 160833.745 124540.738 148670.279
7th 160833.664 124539.113 148603.442
Table 8: Akaike’s Information Criterion on Table 6’s Regressions.
Polynomial Balance-Sheet Grants Entitlements Grants Fiscal Revenues
1st 172064.448 164602.571 191359.093
2nd 172069.360 164598.628 191218.151
3rd 172057.592 164595.107 191148.309
4th 172054.038 164589.237 191092.644
5th 172043.676 164564.416 191051.900
6th 172041.834 164564.188 191039.731
7th 172041.579 164566.054 191008.260
1st 169429.087 162380.464 188412.840
2nd 169432.977 162378.699 188258.391
3rd 169420.150 162368.973 188171.225
4th 169413.398 162365.177 188100.146
5th 169396.511 162335.281 188045.329
6th 169391.754 162335.280 188030.322








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: Effect of Electoral System and Political Alignment on Revenues, RE Model.
Balance-Sheet Grants
Polynomial Controls Runoff*Align Runoff*(1-Align) (1-Runoff)*Align
β s.d. β s.d. β s.d.
Runoff*Align Runoff*(1-Align) (1-Runoff)*Align
1st N 8.702* (5.104) 1.727 (4.987) -1.664 (1.190)
2nd N 7.349 (5.611) 0.369 (5.505) -1.662 (1.190)
3rd N 7.770 (5.607) 0.749 (5.512) -1.648 (1.190)
4th N 7.997 (5.611) 0.980 (5.514) -1.637 (1.190)
5th N 8.412 (5.610) 1.454 (5.518) -1.611 (1.190)
6th N 8.634 (5.617) 1.676 (5.522) -1.603 (1.190)
7th N 8.520 (5.641) 1.569 (5.536) -1.606 (1.190)
1st Y 8.386 (5.140) 1.715 (5.003) -1.725 (1.317)
2nd Y 8.858 (5.651) 2.190 (5.529) -1.726 (1.317)
3rd Y 9.347* (5.649) 2.644 (5.539) -1.721 (1.316)
4th Y 9.652* (5.654) 2.965 (5.543) -1.724 (1.316)
5th Y 10.114* (5.656) 3.521 (5.550) -1.728 (1.316)
6th Y 10.468* (5.663) 3.889 (5.555) -1.730 (1.316)




Year fixed effects Y
Entitlement Grants
1st N 8.410** (3.733) 1.760 (3.775) -1.783 (1.234)
2nd N 6.694* (4.018) 0.044 (4.060) -1.781 (1.234)
3rd N 7.006* (4.013) 0.333 (4.077) -1.772 (1.234)
4th N 7.293* (4.020) 0.619 (4.076) -1.758 (1.234)
5th N 7.884* (4.029) 1.261 (4.087) -1.722 (1.234)
6th N 7.808* (4.035) 1.189 (4.091) -1.725 (1.234)
7th N 7.886* (4.053) 1.260 (4.099) -1.723 (1.234)
1st Y 9.596*** (3.701) 3.024 (3.709) -1.216 (1.421)
2nd Y 7.773* (3.990) 1.204 (4.010) -1.215 (1.421)
3rd Y 8.079** (3.985) 1.494 (4.027) -1.212 (1.421)
4th Y 8.401** (3.993) 1.826 (4.027) -1.213 (1.421)
5th Y 9.025** (4.005) 2.536 (4.038) -1.210 (1.421)
6th Y 9.028** (4.013) 2.539 (4.045) -1.210 (1.421)




Year fixed effects Y
Fiscal Revenues
1st N -14.715 (12.529) -15.000 (12.451) 3.315* (1.861)
2nd N -34.104*** (12.452) -34.490*** (12.359) 3.397* (1.856)
3rd N -32.313*** (12.505) -32.873*** (12.387) 3.456* (1.856)
4th N -30.794** (12.577) -31.330** (12.430) 3.534* (1.857)
5th N -29.469** (12.646) -29.818** (12.485) 3.615* (1.858)
6th N -28.491** (12.680) -28.838** (12.515) 3.652** (1.858)
7th N -26.252** (12.737) -26.731** (12.571) 3.714** (1.859)
1st Y -13.859 (12.364) -13.866 (12.296) 4.092** (2.001)
2nd Y -34.477*** (12.209) -34.568*** (12.132) 4.153** (1.991)
3rd Y -32.544*** (12.271) -32.771*** (12.166) 4.173** (1.991)
4th Y -30.868** (12.365) -31.008** (12.223) 4.158** (1.991)
5th Y -29.415** (12.469) -29.260** (12.305) 4.144** (1.990)
6th Y -28.338** (12.509) -28.141** (12.340) 4.136** (1.991)




Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Parametric random-effect model with errors clustered
at the municipality level. Reported are solely the figures for the interaction between the runoff
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12: Effect of Electoral System and Political Alignment on Revenues, Non-
Parametric Approach.
Balance-Sheet Grants
Bandwidth Controls Runoff*Align Runoff*(1-Align) (1-Runoff)*Align
β s.d. β s.d. β s.d.
2,000 N 8.560* (5.105) 1.714 (4.987) -1.660 (1.190)
5,000 N 8.702* (5.104) 1.727 (4.987) -1.664 (1.190)
8,000 N 8.702* (5.104) 1.727 (4.987) -1.664 (1.190)
10,000 N 8.702* (5.104) 1.727 (4.987) -1.664 (1.190)
2,000 Y 8.260 (5.142) 1.720 (5.004) -1.718 (1.316)
5,000 Y 8.386 (5.140) 1.715 (5.003) -1.725 (1.317)
8,000 Y 8.386 (5.140) 1.715 (5.003) -1.725 (1.317)




Year fixed effects Y
Entitlement Grants
2,000 N 8.442** (3.737) 1.871 (3.775) -1.780 (1.234)
5,000 N 8.410** (3.733) 1.760 (3.775) -1.783 (1.234)
8,000 N 8.410** (3.733) 1.760 (3.775) -1.783 (1.234)
10,000 N 8.410** (3.733) 1.760 (3.775) -1.783 (1.234)
2,000 Y 9.616*** (3.705) 3.132 (3.710) -1.212 (1.421)
5,000 Y 9.596*** (3.701) 3.024 (3.709) -1.216 (1.421)
8,000 Y 9.596*** (3.701) 3.024 (3.709) -1.216 (1.421)




Year fixed effects Y
Fiscal Revenues
2,000 N -14.217 (12.526) -14.454 (12.448) 3.331* (1.861)
5,000 N -14.715 (12.529) -15.000 (12.451) 3.315* (1.861)
8,000 N -14.715 (12.529) -15.000 (12.451) 3.315* (1.861)
10,000 N -14.715 (12.529) -15.000 (12.451) 3.315* (1.861)
2,000 Y -13.364 (12.362) -13.315 (12.294) 4.100** (2.001)
5,000 Y -13.859 (12.364) -13.866 (12.296) 4.092** (2.001)
8,000 Y -13.859 (12.364) -13.866 (12.296) 4.092** (2.001)




Year fixed effects Y
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Non-Parametric Fixed-effect model with errors clus-
tered at the municipality level. Reported are solely the figures for the interaction between the





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: McCrary Test: Weighted kernel estimation of the log density, performed sep-
arately on either side of the 15,000 threshold. Optimal bandwidth and binsize as in
McCrary (2008).
From the early Nineties a process of devolution of powers and fiscal autonomy
has begun, in the hope of improving the provision of local public goods, increasing
the accountability and efficiency of the civil service, and giving more substantial
powers to the local communities. Up to that moment in time intergovernmental
grants were mostly driven by the past expenditure patterns. This generated very
obvious political and efficiency incentives to moral hazard, that gave way to the
formation of large territorial disparities in the number of civil servants, output and
efficiency levels.
In 1992 an organic reform of local authorities was passed. From that moment
onwards all the CEOs of local authorities, mayors included, are directly elected by
voters together with the respective council. This direct election reinforced their
visibility and accountability. The new electoral systems were designed to ensure the
mayor a stable majority in the city council, increasing transparency and reducing
the impact of non-transparent post-electoral deals between parties.
Mayor and city council form a sort of presidential system; they are elected simul-
taneously in a way that locks in the elected mayor with the pre-electoral coalition of
parties that fielded him or her, and each mayoral candidate is visibly linked with the
parties that fielded him or her on the ballot paper. Every municipality is called to
elect its mayor and city council every five years, and each year some municipalities
are called to renew their elected officers.
The details of the electoral system though differ in municipalities above or be-
the most recent general elections held in April 2008, the turnout—excluding Italians living abroad who
voted by post—was 80.51%.
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Figure 3: Scatter and local linear regression with 95% c.i. of percentage of children in

















































































Figure 4: Scatter and local linear regression with 95% c.i. of percentage of elderly in


















































































Figure 5: Scatter and local linear regression with 95% c.i. of per capita income in munic-




















































































Figure 6: Scatter and local linear regression with 95% c.i. of per share of votes accruing to
left-wing parties in each municipalities performed separately at either side of the 15,000-












































































Figure 7: Scatter and local linear regression with 95% c.i. of population density in




















































































Figure 8: Scatter and local linear regression of Entitlement Grants performed separately
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Figure 9: Scatter and local linear regression of Balance-Sheet State Grants performed
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Figure 10: Scatter and local linear regression of Fiscal Revenues performed separately at
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low the 15,000-inhabitant threshold. In municipalities which have less than 15,000
inhabitants according to the latest available census, the mayor is elected through
plurality rule (first-past-the-post), while for larger municipalities a runoff system is
in use. This means that if no mayor reaches an absolute majority in the first round
(50%+1 votes), two weeks later voters are called a second time to the booths to
choose between the two most voted candidates. The most voted among the two
second-leg candidates is going to be the elected mayor.
Finally, the electoral law also differs in how city councils are elected. As already
mentioned, all city councillors are elected through a single-district proportional
representation system. The proportional distribution of seats is “corrected” in order
to ensure that the list (or group of lists) linked with the winning mayor is awarded
a majority of seats. In smaller municipalities two thirds of council is awarded to
councillors linked with the ruling mayor, while in larger ones this figure is reduced
to 60%.5 In smaller municipalities each mayor can be linked to only one city-
councillor list. This means that if a coalition of parties wants to jointly field a
single mayor, they also have to merge into a joint single list of city councillors. In
larger municipalities instead each mayor could be linked to more than one city-
councillor list, so formalizing plural pre-electoral coalitions, and not constraining
different parties to field a single city-councillor list.
It must be underlined how the electoral system is the only institutional, legal or
regulatory difference between municipalities at either side of the 15,000-inhabitant
threshold.
The difference in electoral system has elicited a sharp difference in the political
environment. In smaller localities, local party politics is often dominated by voters’
associations (liste civiche), which are generally not linked with any national party.
The prevalence of local “independent” candidates is possibly obvious in very small
municipalities, representing only small hamlets, but is less so in municipalities near
the 15,000-inhabitant threshold. In Table 1 an example of this is offered: among
municipalities with population between 15 and 20 thousands only 11% of mayors
did not belong to any official national party. If we look at the same figure for
municipalities with population between 10 and 15 thousands, we see that more
than a third of the mayors belong to local voters’ associations.
Moreover, Bordignon et al. (2011)’s empirical analysis shows evidence that where
the electoral system in use is runoff, the local polity is characterized by a larger
number of parties. From the theoretical perspective, this same paper (coherently
among others with Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Chamon et al. (2008)) indicates
that one should expect more centrist mayors to be elected under runoff as opposed
to plurality.
As shown in Tables 2–3, we can see that very few municipalities passed the
threshold of 15,000 inhabitants and therefore changed electoral system as a con-
sequence of the 2001 census. Moreover, as local elections happen every year, this
5The electoral system for larger municipalities actually has some further characteristics that would
theoretically allow for the election of a divided government: the “premium” in terms of seats is awarded
to the coalition of parties linked to the winning mayor, but only if it reaches at least 40% of votes in the
first round. Moreover split voting is allowed, and if a coalition of parties reaches 50% of votes in the first
round, it’s awarded automatically 60% of seats, whether their mayoral candidate is elected or not. These
contingencies are practically very rare, and are reported just for completeness.
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change went into force in a staggered way between 2003 and 2007 according to the
year in which each of these municipalities’ legislature ended their terms.
Municipal Financing
Also the municipal financing system started to change in the early Nineties, increas-
ing fiscal and spending powers of local government. Financial autonomy increased
noticeably. From 1993 of a property tax (ICI) collected by municipalities has been
instituted, which is still the backbone of municipal revenues. Municipalities from
1999 municipalities have been given a further possibility of imposing taxes: they
can operate a small surtax on the Personal Income Tax (up to an additional 0.5% on
top of the personal income tax rate).6 Moreover from 2002 they have been granted
access to a fixed share of the Personal Income Tax revenues generated in their terri-
tory. Each time new local taxes, or shares of national taxes, have been transferred
to municipalities, the grants have been offset by an equivalent amount, calculated
at the basic or default tax rate. Municipalities also levy fees on advertising bill-
boards, on the use of public spaces, on rubbish collection and set administrative
duties for a range of bureaucratic services (issuing parking permits, ID cards, vital
record certificates).
In the period of interest of this paper, about 40% of current revenues accrue
from intergovernmental grants (mostly from central government), 40% from taxes
and fees, and another 20% from smaller sources of revenues linked with the provision
or management of public services (school meals, sport facilities, parking tickets).
After the European Stability and Growth Pact entered into force in 1997, the cen-
tral government decided to implement a so-called Domestic Stability Pact between
the central government and all local authorities, that strongly limits the possibility
of municipalities to financing their spending needs through debt (see, once again,
Brugnoli (2011) for a throurough analysis of investment spending dynamics). The
Domestic Stability Pact does not apply to very small municipalities (below 5,000
inhabitants), which have evident issues with economies of scale, and have been often
preserved from central government cuts in grants. For this reason, we are going to
drop these municipalities, which are almost 6,000.
The high degree of financial autonomy of municipalities is tempered by the even
wider heterogeneity in tax compliance, fiscal capacity and expenditure across the
country. Moreover, each Budget Bill contains a large amount of ad-hoc funding
provisions, which may be more likely to follow political, rather than efficiency and
equity criteria.
As already mentioned, there is no implicit or explicit formula which overlooks
the whole grant system, and each Budget Bill establishes “freely” the amount of
each grant, and the way to distribute it across municipalities, taking as a point of
reference the previous year’s decisions. This is confirmed both by the legal and
administrative regulations overlooking this issue, and by conversations had with
officers from IFEL (the Local Public Finance research foundation of the National
Association of Italian Municipalities ANCI ), who confirmed this.
6It must be observed though, that municipalities are allowed to raise the tax rate by at most 0.2%
more than the previous year. Moreover in more than one occasion the central government temporarily
suspended the possibility of raising the surtax rate.
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The process through which the Budget Bill is passed by the Parliament (both
House and Senate) most of times lacks transparency and linearity. In the last quarter
of the year the government introduces the draft Budget Bill to the Parliament to be
discussed, amended and passed. It will be discussed by multiple select committees
and on the floor of each chamber. The final version of the Bill results from the
interaction of the parliamentary discussion and of the government bargaining with
all the interested actors (parties, unions, local authorities). The Bill passed by the
Parliament may (or may not!) be very different from the one initially introduced
to the Parliament. Along this process it is very unlikely that specific provisions
tailored for specific municipalities are ever picked up by the press.
Data Appendix
The data was acquired from various sources. The Local Public Finance Directorate
of the Interior Ministry (http://finanzalocale.interno.it) publishes all the data on
grants . The Internal and Territorial Affairs Directorate publishes data on city coun-
cillors and mayors, including their party affiliation (http://amministratori.interno.it).
The same directorate (http://elezioni.interno.it) publishes national election data.
The Ministry of Finance keeps the record of Income Tax base by municipality,
but publishes them only partially. These public data have been obtained through
the Technical Secretariat of the Labour Ministry, to which we are very grateful.
The National Statistical Office (ISTAT) publishes data on the demographic com-
position of each municipality, both for each census, and for the so-called “intercensus
reconstructions”, i.e. the yearly data obtained integrating the yearly net migration
data of municipality to the census data.
Next, a description of each variable used in the dataset. All monetary values are
expressed in 2008 constant Euros.
Robustness Checks
To confirm that our results are robust and the identification strategy correct, we
need to make sure that the discontinuity we found in the dependent variable does
not rise from undetected discontinuities of our exogenous variables.
Firstly, we check that no sorting is happening. By sorting we mean the possi-
bility that municipalities may want (and possibly succeed) to pick their electoral
system, tampering or simply trying to affect purposedly the population figures. The
possibility that mayors may try to do so, strategically acting on the census figures in
order to be on a certain side of the threshold, appears quite unlikely. The censuses
are run independently from the political power. Most importantly, though, the ef-
fect of sorting one’s municipality at the preferred side of the threshold are to be
enjoyed not by the current mayor, but by the one elected at the following electoral
round. This would substantially lower the incentives of strategic behaviour.
In order to check whether there are discontinuities in the forcing variable (i.e.,
the census figures) various techniques are possible. Firstly, we could simply look at
a histogram of the municipalities by population before and after the 2001 census
(resp. left- and right-hand panels) for different bin sizes (500 and 250 inhabitants,
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Figure 1). Visual inspection highlights a slight increase in the density just on the
right of the cut-off. We do not believe this is enough evidence to support any sorting.
The increase is more pronounced in the 2001 panel, but it was already present in
the data from the 1991 census, when there was as yet no change of electoral system
across the 15,000-inhabitant cut-off.
Secondly, we also perform a McCrary continuity test (McCrary [2008]), in order
to check whether the density of municipalities at the sides of the cut-off is discontin-
uous. In Figure 2 the results of this test are exposed. The figure recalls the shape
of the histograms in Figure 1, and no discontinuity is found. The density is strongly
decreasing as the population increases, but this simply reflects the fact that Italians
mostly live in smaller municipalities, and that the number of larger municipalities
decreases as the population increases.
In Figures 3-7 we confirm that the main controls exhibit no substantial dis-
continuity at the 15,000 threshold, through separate local polynomial regressions
(by year) of the percentage of children, elderly people, income, on general-election
behaviour, and population density.
All these checks ensure with some degree of certainty that no discontinuity ap-
pears in the covariates of our regressions.
Finally, we report the results as exposed in Tables 5-6 already described in the
previous section, using a panel-data model with random effects (see Tables 9-??). A
further alternative specification involves using a non-parametric approach to RDD.
This implies regressing our dependent variable on a linear polynomial of the forcing
variable and limiting the sample to a narrow window around the threshold. We
perform this analysis with and without control variables, and for a bandwidth of 2-,
5-, 8- and 10-thousand inhabitants on each side of the 15,000-inhabitants threshold.
The result of these regressions are reported in Tables 11-12.
Our results are generally unaffected in their sign and significance by using dif-
ferent specifications, both in the significance and in magnitude.
Finally, we perform a placebo analysis with the original (fixed-effect) specifica-
tion. In order to do this we repeat the analysis using fictitious treatments, and
expect to find no significance. In Tables 14-?? one can observe the results obtained
from both of our placebo treatments. By “placebo A” we indicate the results ob-
tained dropping all observation whose relevant population variable is below 15,000,
and considering as a fictitious treatment the median of the remaining sample (7,258
inhabitants). By “placebo B” instead we mean considering only the part of the
sample with census population above the 15,000-inhabitant threshold, and apply-
ing a fictitious treatment at the 25,544-inhabitant level (which is, once again, the
median of the remaining sample). Also in this case, most of the placebo tests fail
to reach any significance, confirming the robustness of our results.
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